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Showing posts with label Paul Warburg. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Paul Warburg. Show all posts

Monday, December 23, 2013

A Century Of Ruining Our Lives!

Today The Banksters Are Celebrating 100 Years Of Theft

December 23, 2013 by  
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Today The Banksters Are Celebrating 100 Years Of Theft
PHOTOS.COM

Today is the Federal Reserve’s 100thbirthday. It’s likely to slip by with little fanfare, though it should be a day that lives in infamy. It’s more destructive than Pearl Harbor. In fact, it made Pearl Harbor — and all wars in the last 100 years — possible.
One hundred years ago today, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act. The act itself was conceived three years earlier during a secret meeting of moneyed elites and their U.S. Senator/proxy on Jekyll Island, Ga.
The conspirators were Senator Nelson Aldrich, the father-in-law of John D. Rockefeller Jr. (the Standard Oil group); Paul Warburg, a German banker representing the German banking conglomerate MM Warburg of Hamburg, Germany and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in the U.S.; Henry P. Davison, a partner at JP Morgan and chairman of Bankers Trust Company; Benjamin Strong, vice president of Bankers Trust; Frank Vanderlip, chairman of National City Bank; and Charles D. Norton, president of First National Bank. Bankers Trust, National City Bank and First National Bank were all part of the Morgan group of banks. Vanderlip was also a Rockefeller agent (related by marriage) and was a director of Rockefeller’s railroad and lumber concerns.
Like most all nefarious legislation, the Federal Reserve Act was passed in a rush. Congress was eager to head home for the holidays; so two days before Christmas, there was no stomach in Washington for a lengthy debate on the bill’s merits. In fact, 28 of the 96 Senators had already left Washington. The act passed the Senate 43-25. The act got more support in the House, where 77 of 435 members had gone home. The vote was 298 for, 60 against. President Woodrow Wilson then quickly signed it.
It was also passed based on a false flag event. Propagandists for the legislation cited a desire to prevent a financial panic — like the one that occurred in 1907 — as a reason for its passage. But the 1907 panic was precipitated by two events: inflation created in violation of Department of Treasury statutes and actions by the money trust — a group dominated by the JP Morgan firm and its allies affiliated with Rockefeller, the railroad baron Edward Harriman and Kuhn, Loeb.
Treasury Secretary Leslie Shaw wanted a central bank. Wall Street was pushing for one. Shaw created inflation by depositing Treasury funds in favored large national banks.
The money trust also wanted a central bank, but their primary motive for the creating the panic was to destroy the upstart Frederick Augustus Heinze.
Heinze, along with C.W. Morse, had begun acquiring banks; and the two had incorporated a speculative vehicle named United Copper Company. The money trust called in their loans to United Copper, which set up a run on the Heinze-Morse Mercantile National Bank. It was this action that precipitated the panic. So as is often the case, the group that stood to gain most by the crisis precipitated it and then created the solution.
And while they lobbied for its passage behind the scenes, in public members of the money trust spoke against it and sold it as something it was not. The deception was necessary to fool the public, which was skeptical of a central bank.
The Fed’s creation by the Federal Reserve Act effectively legalized the money trust dominated by Morgan (backed by money from the Rothschild dynasty) and Rockefeller. Today, the Fed continues as a private entity with private shareholders. There is nothing Federal about it. It is a monopoly over which Congress has little control. It cannot even be fully audited by Congress or the Federal government even though it ostensibly controls all U.S. gold deposits.
What the Federal Reserve Act did was legalize theft.
The Federal Reserve was given a monopoly on the issue of all bank notes and all national and State banks could then issue only deposits. All deposits had to be redeemable in Federal Reserve notes. All national banks were required to become members of the Federal Reserve System.
As Murray Rothbard wrote in The Case Against the Fed, all “national bank reserves had to be kept in the form of demand deposits, or checking accounts, at the Fed. The Fed was now in place as lender of last resort; and with the prestige, power, and resources of the U. S. Treasury solidly behind it, it could inflate more consistently than the Wall Street banks under the National Banking System, and above all, it could and did, inflate even during recessions, in order to bail out the banks. The Fed could now try to keep the economy from recessions that liquidated the unsound investments of the inflationary boom, and it could try to keep the inflation going indefinitely.”
“At this point, there was no need for even national banks to hold onto gold; they could, and did, deposit their gold into the vaults of the Fed, and receive reserves upon which they could pyramid and expand the supply of money and credit in a coordinated, nation-wide fashion. Moreover, with reserves now centralized into the vaults of the Fed, bank reserves could be, as the bank apologists proclaimed, ‘economized,’ i.e., there could be and was more inflationary credit, more bank ‘counterfeiting,’ pyramided on top of the given gold reserves. There were now three inverted inflationary pyramids of bank credit in the American economy: the Fed pyramided its notes and deposits on top of its newly centralized gold supply; the national banks pyramided bank deposits on top of their reserves of deposits at the Fed; and those state banks who chose not to exercise their option of joining the Federal Reserve System could keep their deposit accounts at national banks and pyramid their credit on top of that. And at the base of the pyramid, the Fed could coordinate and control the inflation by determining the amount of reserves in the member banks.”
Inflation is theft. When new money is created, the elites get to use it before it gets into the economy and dilutes the buying power of the money you hold. Not one person in a million understands this, and they buy into the government’s lie that inflation is necessary for a sound economy. They believe that inflation is rising prices. It is not.
Since the Fed’s creation the dollar has lost 96 percent of its value. It’s driving fast toward complete worthlessness.
In his book, What You Should Know About Inflation, Henry Hazlitt wrote, “Inflation is the increase in the money supply and credit. The word ‘inflation’ once applied only to the quantity of money. It meant that the volume of money was inflated, blown up or overextended… As the money supply is increased, people have more money to offer for goods. But if the supply of goods doesn’t increase — or increases at a slower pace than the money supply — the prices of goods goes up. Each individual dollar becomes less valuable because there are more dollars available. This leads to more of them being offered for a commodity. A ‘price’ is an exchange ratio between a dollar and a unit of goods. When people have more dollars, they value them less. Goods then rise in price, not because there are fewer goods than before, but rather because there are more dollars available.”
Anything that artificially increases aggregate demand for goods and services is inflation. It could be lowering interest rates, increasing credit or money printing, as the Fed has been doing with its so-called quantitative easing.
This is the uncomfortable truth the money creators don’t want you to know. They hide it because it keeps interest rates on national borrowing low; it allows the government to keep Social Security and other welfare payments and cost of living increases low; it allows the Fed to keep interest rates low for borrowers so as to encourage a phony expansion of a debt-dependent economy; and it props up the stock market, which helps Wall Street and gives the illusion of prosperity.
Inflation — which is really devaluation of currency — is the perfect crime. The money creators steal the purchasing power of your paper money no matter where it is. They do this by pouring more water in the milk — diluting the value of all paper money by printing more. It is nothing more than a hidden tax.
For this, you can thank the Fed. Very unhappy birthday wishes to it.

Sunday, December 22, 2013

A History Lesson.Fed Tactics Used Are From 1900

Bernanke's Recession-Fighting Weapon Developed by 1900s Banker

Friday, 20 Dec 2013 07:17 AM

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The first weapon Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke deployed against the worst recession since World War II owes a singular debt to Paul M. Warburg, a banker in the 1900s who understood money markets more than any contributor to the Federal Reserve Act.
When President Woodrow Wilson signed the act on Dec. 23, 1913, its central purpose was to serve as a backstop to a financial system that had lurched from one crisis to the next in the preceding decades. The concept of backstop lending came from Warburg, a native of Germany whose writings reveal concern that he never got appropriate credit for his role.
Nearly 100 years later, his ideas were vindicated when Bernanke used the so-called discount window on Oct. 29, 2008, to provide banks with $111 billion in loans as short-term credit markets nearly froze in the wake of the Sept. 15 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The Fed chairman also used emergency powers to support money markets, which Warburg had flagged as critical to financial-system liquidity.
Warburg “is the father of the discount window in the United States” and “the grandfather of the Federal Reserve,” said Michael Bordo, director of the Center for Monetary and Financial History at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. If his “plan had been followed, the Fed would have done a lot better in the 1920s, and the Great Depression might not have been so bad.”
Unusual Choice
Warburg, who served from 1914 to 1918 as one of the first Fed governors and the second vice chairman, was an unusual political choice for a foundational seat on America’s new central bank. He was an investment banker at Kuhn, Loeb & Co. when Congress was suspicious of financial power. He disliked the decentralized scheme the American political system devised for the Fed and fought to consolidate it. At the heart of his concern was the need for a centralized money market the Fed would support if a panic erupted.
The U.S. was still on a gold standard, and Warburg saw that one way to create flexibility in such a rigid currency system was for banks to be able to discount, or sell, short-term liabilities in exchange for money. Today, they routinely fund themselves with short-term commercial paper and repurchase agreements that allow them to use securities as collateral for short-term loans.
In the course of daily business, the central bank wouldn’t be an active player, simply a buyer of last resort if a bank couldn’t secure funding. The cost of direct loans from the Fed would be the discount rate, which banks would pay to access the discount window.
Warburg ‘Aghast’
During a January 1913 hearing on banking and currency reform before a House subcommittee, Warburg told its chairman, Carter Glass — who guided the Federal Reserve Act into law — that he was “aghast” at the conditions of U.S. money markets when he arrived in America.
“I saw money rates of 25 and 30 percent,” he told Glass. “There was then one of those discussions going on, as they have been going on ever since, as to what to do.”
Later in the hearing, he said he knew exactly what action should be taken.
“Neither the banks nor the central reserve itself would be safe without the introduction of commercial or banking paper as a means of exchange,” Warburg said. “The key, if you please, to the vaults of the central reserve is furnished” by short- term debts that banks could turn quickly into cash.
Opposed Ideas
Wilson and Glass opposed some of his ideas, with Glass even criticizing the notion that Warburg contributed anything to the act.
“Warburg did not draft a sentence of the bill,” Glass wrote to his life-long friend Robert Latham Owen in a letter that was found in an archive of Glass’s papers at the University of Virginia’s Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library. Owen sponsored the act in the Senate.
Still, both Wilson and Glass insisted Warburg serve on and help navigate the central bank in its formative years. His expertise was broadly recognized at the time, even among the general public.
“Such appointments as yours and your colleagues must tend to restore confidence toward establishing the new financial system,” F.W. Kelsey, head of a Manhattan nursery company, wrote Warburg in a May 8 letter found in the Paul Moritz Warburg papers, manuscripts and archives of the Yale University Library in New Haven, Connecticut.
‘Highest Standing’
Marcus Marks, Manhattan borough president, called Warburg “the best equipped man in the country to take on the duties of this position” in a May 5 letter. William Sproule, president of the Southern Pacific Railroad, wrote on May 6 he had a “sense of refreshment” that “a professional banker of the highest standing” accepted the job.
After graduating from school in Hamburg at 18, Warburg began apprenticeships in various financial houses, including the British investment bank Samuel Montagu & Co. and his great- grandfather’s firm, M.M. Warburg & Co., founded in 1798. He came to the U.S. in 1902, following his marriage to Nina Loeb, daughter of the founder of Kuhn Loeb.
Warburg’s European experience in import-export financing and commercial trade in the money markets would define his approach to central banking. In his view, the financial system needed a centralized, secondary money market where banks could immediately raise funds by taking commercial paper and trade credits, known as bankers acceptances, and selling them. He called them “quick assets,” a term that reflected his sense of securities almost as fungible as cash itself.
Critical Lesson
A century later, Gary Gorton, a professor of management and finance at the Yale School of Management, wrote that one of the critical lessons from the 2008 financial turmoil was that short- term debt can serve as a form of private money.
“An important misunderstanding revealed by the crisis is that regulators and economists did not know what firms were banks or what debt was ‘money,’” he said in his 2012 book “Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming.” “They thought that banks were only the firms that had bank charters and that money was only in currency and demand deposits.”
As Gorton points out, investors can write checks against their money-market mutual funds, which hold commercial paper, as easily as they can against cash deposits in their bank accounts. The financial crisis was mainly a modern-day run on these forms of money as confidence in the firms or assets that sponsored them eroded, which is what caused Bernanke to support these markets with emergency facilities.
Fed Roots
The central bank “has rediscovered its roots, in the sense that the Fed was created to stabilize the financial system in times of panic,” Bernanke said at a Dec. 18 press conference explaining the contributions of his chairmanship, which ends Jan. 31. “And we did that, and we used tools that were analogous in spirit to what the central banks have done for many hundreds of years, but of course adapted to a modern financial system.”
Warburg’s papers at Yale show tireless effort to start the market for bankers acceptances, which were more secure than commercial paper because they were backed by a bank that had “accepted” or put its name on the short-term credit, enhancing its appeal in secondary markets.
He spent hours refining regulations, drafts in his notes show, and scolded Benjamin Strong, the first head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for not being more excited about the market.
“Do not get into the most discouraging and disappointing attitude of saying that no business can be done by the Federal Reserve Banks when, as a matter of fact, I know it can be done, and if I were in charge in New York, I know I could buy millions of bank acceptances,” Warburg wrote to Strong on Feb. 17, 1915.
Unmistakable Fingerprint
However much Glass, Owen and others might have tried to minimize Warburg’s contribution to the act, the original document bears his unmistakable fingerprint in the preamble.
In addition to establishing regional reserve banks and furnishing an elastic currency, the third directive reads: “to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper.”
In his 1930 memoir, Warburg called Glass and others who took credit for the act “pleaders in their own cause.”
“The Reserve System is the product of the labors of many minds,” Warburg wrote. The development of America’s central bank “must be looked upon as a national monument, like the old cathedrals of Europe, which were the work of many generations and of many masters and are treasured as symbols of national achievement.”
© Copyright 2013 Bloomberg News. All rights reserved.


A History Lesson.Fed Tactics Used Are From 1900

Bernanke's Recession-Fighting Weapon Developed by 1900s Banker

Friday, 20 Dec 2013 07:17 AM

Share:
A    A   |
   Email Us   |
   Print   |
   Forward Article  |
The first weapon Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke deployed against the worst recession since World War II owes a singular debt to Paul M. Warburg, a banker in the 1900s who understood money markets more than any contributor to the Federal Reserve Act.
When President Woodrow Wilson signed the act on Dec. 23, 1913, its central purpose was to serve as a backstop to a financial system that had lurched from one crisis to the next in the preceding decades. The concept of backstop lending came from Warburg, a native of Germany whose writings reveal concern that he never got appropriate credit for his role.
Nearly 100 years later, his ideas were vindicated when Bernanke used the so-called discount window on Oct. 29, 2008, to provide banks with $111 billion in loans as short-term credit markets nearly froze in the wake of the Sept. 15 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The Fed chairman also used emergency powers to support money markets, which Warburg had flagged as critical to financial-system liquidity.
Warburg “is the father of the discount window in the United States” and “the grandfather of the Federal Reserve,” said Michael Bordo, director of the Center for Monetary and Financial History at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. If his “plan had been followed, the Fed would have done a lot better in the 1920s, and the Great Depression might not have been so bad.”
Unusual Choice
Warburg, who served from 1914 to 1918 as one of the first Fed governors and the second vice chairman, was an unusual political choice for a foundational seat on America’s new central bank. He was an investment banker at Kuhn, Loeb & Co. when Congress was suspicious of financial power. He disliked the decentralized scheme the American political system devised for the Fed and fought to consolidate it. At the heart of his concern was the need for a centralized money market the Fed would support if a panic erupted.
The U.S. was still on a gold standard, and Warburg saw that one way to create flexibility in such a rigid currency system was for banks to be able to discount, or sell, short-term liabilities in exchange for money. Today, they routinely fund themselves with short-term commercial paper and repurchase agreements that allow them to use securities as collateral for short-term loans.
In the course of daily business, the central bank wouldn’t be an active player, simply a buyer of last resort if a bank couldn’t secure funding. The cost of direct loans from the Fed would be the discount rate, which banks would pay to access the discount window.
Warburg ‘Aghast’
During a January 1913 hearing on banking and currency reform before a House subcommittee, Warburg told its chairman, Carter Glass — who guided the Federal Reserve Act into law — that he was “aghast” at the conditions of U.S. money markets when he arrived in America.
“I saw money rates of 25 and 30 percent,” he told Glass. “There was then one of those discussions going on, as they have been going on ever since, as to what to do.”
Later in the hearing, he said he knew exactly what action should be taken.
“Neither the banks nor the central reserve itself would be safe without the introduction of commercial or banking paper as a means of exchange,” Warburg said. “The key, if you please, to the vaults of the central reserve is furnished” by short- term debts that banks could turn quickly into cash.
Opposed Ideas
Wilson and Glass opposed some of his ideas, with Glass even criticizing the notion that Warburg contributed anything to the act.
“Warburg did not draft a sentence of the bill,” Glass wrote to his life-long friend Robert Latham Owen in a letter that was found in an archive of Glass’s papers at the University of Virginia’s Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library. Owen sponsored the act in the Senate.
Still, both Wilson and Glass insisted Warburg serve on and help navigate the central bank in its formative years. His expertise was broadly recognized at the time, even among the general public.
“Such appointments as yours and your colleagues must tend to restore confidence toward establishing the new financial system,” F.W. Kelsey, head of a Manhattan nursery company, wrote Warburg in a May 8 letter found in the Paul Moritz Warburg papers, manuscripts and archives of the Yale University Library in New Haven, Connecticut.
‘Highest Standing’
Marcus Marks, Manhattan borough president, called Warburg “the best equipped man in the country to take on the duties of this position” in a May 5 letter. William Sproule, president of the Southern Pacific Railroad, wrote on May 6 he had a “sense of refreshment” that “a professional banker of the highest standing” accepted the job.
After graduating from school in Hamburg at 18, Warburg began apprenticeships in various financial houses, including the British investment bank Samuel Montagu & Co. and his great- grandfather’s firm, M.M. Warburg & Co., founded in 1798. He came to the U.S. in 1902, following his marriage to Nina Loeb, daughter of the founder of Kuhn Loeb.
Warburg’s European experience in import-export financing and commercial trade in the money markets would define his approach to central banking. In his view, the financial system needed a centralized, secondary money market where banks could immediately raise funds by taking commercial paper and trade credits, known as bankers acceptances, and selling them. He called them “quick assets,” a term that reflected his sense of securities almost as fungible as cash itself.
Critical Lesson
A century later, Gary Gorton, a professor of management and finance at the Yale School of Management, wrote that one of the critical lessons from the 2008 financial turmoil was that short- term debt can serve as a form of private money.
“An important misunderstanding revealed by the crisis is that regulators and economists did not know what firms were banks or what debt was ‘money,’” he said in his 2012 book “Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming.” “They thought that banks were only the firms that had bank charters and that money was only in currency and demand deposits.”
As Gorton points out, investors can write checks against their money-market mutual funds, which hold commercial paper, as easily as they can against cash deposits in their bank accounts. The financial crisis was mainly a modern-day run on these forms of money as confidence in the firms or assets that sponsored them eroded, which is what caused Bernanke to support these markets with emergency facilities.
Fed Roots
The central bank “has rediscovered its roots, in the sense that the Fed was created to stabilize the financial system in times of panic,” Bernanke said at a Dec. 18 press conference explaining the contributions of his chairmanship, which ends Jan. 31. “And we did that, and we used tools that were analogous in spirit to what the central banks have done for many hundreds of years, but of course adapted to a modern financial system.”
Warburg’s papers at Yale show tireless effort to start the market for bankers acceptances, which were more secure than commercial paper because they were backed by a bank that had “accepted” or put its name on the short-term credit, enhancing its appeal in secondary markets.
He spent hours refining regulations, drafts in his notes show, and scolded Benjamin Strong, the first head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for not being more excited about the market.
“Do not get into the most discouraging and disappointing attitude of saying that no business can be done by the Federal Reserve Banks when, as a matter of fact, I know it can be done, and if I were in charge in New York, I know I could buy millions of bank acceptances,” Warburg wrote to Strong on Feb. 17, 1915.
Unmistakable Fingerprint
However much Glass, Owen and others might have tried to minimize Warburg’s contribution to the act, the original document bears his unmistakable fingerprint in the preamble.
In addition to establishing regional reserve banks and furnishing an elastic currency, the third directive reads: “to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper.”
In his 1930 memoir, Warburg called Glass and others who took credit for the act “pleaders in their own cause.”
“The Reserve System is the product of the labors of many minds,” Warburg wrote. The development of America’s central bank “must be looked upon as a national monument, like the old cathedrals of Europe, which were the work of many generations and of many masters and are treasured as symbols of national achievement.”
© Copyright 2013 Bloomberg News. All rights reserved.