Of All Planes In The Air Force Inventory, We Love The A-10 Warthog. Its Functionality In Close Combat Is A Valuable Tool Worth Keeping. Also, Its Pilots Love It Due To Its Resilience And Ease Of Flying

A Grunt’s Angel: Ugly, punishing A-10 demise ‘will cost American lives”

Posted on April 23, 2015 // 0 Comments

Ask any ground-pounding Marine if the A-10 is worth it…there’s your answer.

By Grae Stafford, Daily Caller:

The U.S. Air Force and military planners at the Pentagon really want to get rid of the A-10 despite 38 years of stellar service in almost every conflict the United States has been active in.

The USAF claims the A-10 is out of date, and that it’s role can be fulfilled by more modern options. Critics say the decision is a travesty of military thinking. Who’s right?

Well it turns out you don’t have to look very far, because we already know what a world without the A-10 looks like.

Former A-10 pilot and Republican Rep. Martha McSally argues scrapping the A-10 will cost American lives. That alone should give military planners at the Pentagon pause. Our senior military leaders seem to have forgotten an excruciatingly painful lesson about air power the United States learned in Vietnam that cost hundreds of lives and millions of dollars.

Just like in Vietnam 40 years ago, “fast jets” are once again being touted to the American people by Washington bureaucrats as a serviceable replacement for a dedicated niche product. The A-10 isn’t that.

It’s affectionate pet name is “Warthog,” or just “Hog.”

Pentagon planners in the 1960s can be forgiven for their errors in Vietnam. It was a time of new ideas and radical thinking. Military technology had advanced rapidly since World War Two, it was only natural to think that whatever was “newer” and “faster” would undoubtedly be “better.” Thinking like that fielded the first generation of F-4 Phantoms without any onboard gun because “Smart missiles” had supposedly rendered the gun in air combat obsolete. The first high-speed turning dog fights over North Vietnam against MiG 17s and MiG 21s proved that was not so.

The F-35 is today’s version of that thinking.

Like any “fast jet” the F-35 is highly vulnerable to ground fire. The unit cost is anywhere from $96 million to $116 million, so any losses will come with a very steep price tag.

There are countless times in modern American military history where the application of airpower by an A-10 on the front line has made the difference between holding the line and total defeat.

With the cost of losing an F-35 being so prohibitively expensive and the high likelihood of one being lost by the very nature of the role it will be tasked to fill, close air support calls in the future will go unanswered. Not for tactical reasons, but for budgetary ones.

In Vietnam, the primary plane to provide Close Air Support to United States and Vietnamese ground troops was the Douglas A-1 Skyraider. The A-1 was a Korean War-era propeller plane. It was the pinnacle of WW2 fighter design, a holdover from a bygone age. It was exceptionally well armored, heavily armed and thanks to its propeller engine, highly fuel efficient. Its loiter time (the time over target where it could fly in a holding pattern waiting for targets of opportunity or supporting troops) far exceeded its jet compatriots.

With the phasing out of the A-1s, the CAS mantle was taken on by the U.S. Navy and Air Force’s latest generation of “fast jets.”

What followed was a massacre. This was a role that “fast jets” were ill-equipped for, being too fast to be accurate and highly vulnerable to ground fire.

Of the United States Navy and Air Force aircraft combat losses in Vietnam, 437 of them where F-4 Phantoms, 59 were A-7 Corsair IIs, 51 were A-6 Intruders, 195 were A-4 Skyhawks, 198 were F100 Super Sabres and 283 were F-105 Thunderchiefs.

Only 294 American planes in total were lost during the Vietnam war due to air-to-air combat and surface-to-air missiles, the rest was from ground fire.

The reason for the “fast jets” failure in its new role was an intrinsic one.

In principle, a jet engine is a tube. Air is sucked in at the front where it is mixed with gasoline that explodes. The force of that explosion is then ejected out the back as thrust, and in doing so, turns an impeller that sucks more air in and the process repeats itself. It is a very simple concept with huge returns in speed.

In most “fast jets,” the engine runs the entire length of the plane. This design layout, when paired with a good airframe, can make a modern attack fighter one of, if not the most, adaptable tactical assets in a battlefield commander’s arsenal. The F-35 Lightning is the zenith of this concept.

A “fast jet” is little more than a very agile, very expensive, flying bomb. The engine must remain un-damaged. If even a few rounds are punched into the main fuselage by a 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun (the gun favored by most of America’s past, present and future opponents) it can spell catastrophic disaster for the plane and the pilot.

Unless anti-aircraft fire severed a flight control cable, hit the pilot, engine or a fuel tank in the A-1 Skyraider, generally the only result was a hole in your plane. It was still airworthy.

Flying fast-moving, fragile, gas guzzling jets, low and slow over murderous enemy fire was a recipe for disaster. A farmer in a rice paddy could shoot into the sky with an AK-47, and if they got lucky, down a plane.

Having learned a very painful and costly lesson, the Pentagon put out a contract for a dedicated close support aircraft precisely to combat these issues. In 1977 the A-10 Thunderbolt II was born. It was built from the ground up to fly the most dangerous CAS missions. Its two engines were mounted aft of the pilot, away from the heavily armored airframe. Instead of swept wings built for speed the A-10 was built for low speed maneuverability. Watch any airshow video of the A-10 on YouTube and the ability of the A-10 to turn on a dime is still jaw dropping.

An A-10 pilot is protected from the ground fire they inevitably face by 1,200 pounds of titanium. The dual tail control surfaces enable the pilot to maintain control in the event of the plane being badly damaged. There are triple redundant flight control systems. The A-10 was a master stroke of aeronautical design and the living embodiment of the mantra “form following function.” It was not a pretty plane, it was not a sexy plane, but it was a highly resilient plane. So much so that it can still fly with only one engine, one tail, one elevator and half of one wing.

Pentagon planners saw the A-10 as the great equalizer in any theoretical battle with USSR armored forces on the European plains. Their calculations were proved correct in Operation Desert Storm where coalition A-10s made short work of Iraqi tanks. Over the years, through operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the A-10 proved it was unbelievably good at doing precisely what it had been designed for: flying low and slow, absorbing punishment and killing anything that was foolish enough to take a shot at it.

And now, despite being exclusively designed to fill a desperate need, the Air Force wants to kill the A-10.

Today “stealth” is the buzzword. But Air Force staff should be reminded that “stealth” only makes planes “invisible” to radar, not the naked eye. When an F-35 is eventually called upon in the future to provide close air support, I can promise you gunners on the ground will be able to see it just fine … and if they can see it, they can shoot at it, and if they can shoot at it, eventually they will hit it.

The niche role the A-10 fulfills is a specialized one, and in the combat America finds itself embroiled in today, a vital one. CAS is just as important today as it has ever been and in an age where American casualties have huge political consequences, the lack of a specifically designed tool to accomplish it will have severe political ramifications to future administrations.

Arizona Sends Retired USAF Female Colonel To Congress. She Also Believes In The Second Amendment.

From Right To Bear Blog:

Arizona Stands Up for 2nd Amendment Rights – In Spite of Gabby Giffords’ Efforts

WhenRepublican candidate Martha McSally was finally declared the winner of Arizona’s Second Congressional District, it was an historic day. First, her win gives the GOP a landmark majority in the House of Representatives. Second, she defeated a candidate who not only backed gun control, but had aggressive support from the woman who previously held the office, Gabby Giffords.

Giffords is a liberal Democrat who was herself critically injured in a gun attack by a crazed assailant. She and her husband have since devoted themselves to the issue of gun control. McSally’s Democratic opponent in the race, Ron Barber, who worked for Gifford, was also injured in the attack, and two people were killed. Barber has been outspokenly in favor of gun control. McSally ran solidly in support of Second Amendment rights.

The 2nd District, based in Tucson, is considered a prize for each party, and Republicans have been working hard to win it for several years. Mitt Romney carried Arizona in 2012. McSally won the seat by 167 votes, with six votes added after the recount, according to election officials. With McSally’s victory, the GOP gained a net of 13 seats in the midterm elections, giving them a history majority.

Barber said in his concession statement:

Today I congratulated Martha McSally on her victory, and wished her well in serving Southern Arizonans. This result is not the one we hoped for, but we takesolace in having spoken out loud and clear for the principle that every legal vote should be counted.

McSally’s statement said:

There’s no getting around that this was an incredibly close and hard-fought race. After what’s been a long campaign season, it’s time to come together and heal our community. That’s why my focus will be on what unites us, not what divides us, such as providing better economic opportunity for our families and ensuring our country and community are kept safe.

McSally, a retired Air Force colonel, had attempted twice before to win the 2nd District Congressional seat. She competed for the GOP nomination in a special election in 2012, following Giffords’ resignation. In the general election in 2012, McSally lost to Barber by approximately 2500 votes.

Giffords had made it a cause to secure Barber’s re-election, and she placed an ad that ultimately backfired. The ad featured family members making an emotional plea to shame McSally into changing her position. The local newspaper condemned the effort, saying it “waves the bloody shirt” by using “the tragic death of two innocents” to attack McSally. It called the ad “base and vile.”

Although the final vote was remarkably close, Second Amendment supporters believe it indicates the people of Arizona have spoken on the issue of gun control.

Government’s Hidden Agenda

Assault On Nuke Missile Site As Part Of A Drill, Succeeds. Not Good News!

In this image released by the U.S. Air Force, a Malmstrom Air Force Base missile maintenance team removes the upper section of an ICBM at a Montana missile site. An Air Force security team's botched response to a simulated assault on a nuclear missile silo has prompted a blistering review followed by expanded training to deal with the nightmare scenario of a real attack. But an internal review of the exercise held last summer at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana said the security forces were unable to speedily regain control of the captured silo, and called this a "critical deficiency." The Associated Press obtained a copy of the report through a Freedom of Information Act request. (AP Photo/U.S. Air Force, John Parie)

AP Exclusive: Botched nuclear silo drill revealed

Thursday, May 22nd 2014, 5:20 pm

Robert Burns - Ap National Security Writer

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WASHINGTON (AP) — An Air Force security team's botched response to a simulated assault on a nuclear missile silo has prompted a blistering review followed by expanded training to deal with the nightmare scenario of a real attack.

The Air Force recognized the possibility of such an intrusion as more worrisome after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But an internal review of the exercise held last summer at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana said the security forces were unable to speedily regain control of the captured silo, and called this a "critical deficiency."

The Associated Press obtained a copy of the report through a Freedom of Information Act request.

The previously unreported misstep was the reason the 341st Missile Wing flunked a broader safety and security inspection. The unit, which has been beset with other problems in recent months, including an exam-cheating scandal that led its commander to resign in March, passed a do-over of the security portion of the inspection last October.

The failure was one of a string of nuclear missile corps setbacks revealed by the AP over the past year. The force has suffered embarrassing security, leadership and training lapses, discipline breakdowns and morale problems. Earlier this year, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel ordered two reviews, still underway, to address his concern that the lapses could erode public trust in the security of the nation's nuclear weapons.

The partially censored document obtained by the AP indicate that the security team was required to respond to the simulated capture of a Minuteman 3 nuclear missile silo by hostile forces, termed an "Empty Quiver" scenario in which a nuclear weapon is lost, stolen or seized. Each of the Air Force's 450 Minuteman 3 silos contains an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with at least one nuclear warhead and ready for launch on short notice on orders from the president.

The Air Force review examined why the security force showed an "inability to effectively respond to a recapture scenario." It cited a failure to take "all lawful actions necessary to immediately regain control of nuclear weapons" but did not specify those actions.

A section apparently elaborating on what was meant by the phrase "failed to take all lawful actions" was removed from the document before its release to the AP last week. The Air Force said this was withheld in accordance with Pentagon orders "prohibiting the unauthorized dissemination of unclassified information pertaining to security measures" for the protection of "special nuclear material."

The document provided no details on how the silo takeover was simulated, the number of security forces ordered to respond or other basic aspects of the exercise.

The prize for terrorists or others who might seek to seize control of a missile would be the nuclear warhead attached to it, since it contains plutonium and other bomb materials. A rogue launching of the missile is a far different matter, since it would require the decoding of encrypted war orders transmitted only by the president.

In 2009, the Air Force cited a "post-9/11 shift in thinking" about such situations, saying that while this scenario once was considered an impossibility, the U.S. "no longer has the luxury of assuming what is and what is not possible."

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which helped conduct the Malmstrom inspection last August, has called its inspections "likely the most intense, invasive and critical" in the U.S. military. The agency says on its website that its drills are designed to "ensure everybody knows their job, the proper procedures — and how to react when chaos unfolds and the situation changes."

When the Air Force publicly acknowledged the broader inspection failure in August, it said "tactical-level errors" had been committed during one phase of the inspection, but it did not say the errors were made by security forces. At the time, the Air Force declined to provide details, saying to do so could expose potential vulnerabilities.

The report provided to the AP said that because security of nuclear weapons is paramount, "the inability to demonstrate effective recapture/recovery TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) detracts from the Wing's ability to conduct its day-to-day mission."

The document describes in broad terms the nature of the inspection failure, its significance and its underlying causes.

It said insufficient training was at the heart of the problem, beginning with a lack of familiarity among the security forces with "complex scenario" exercises. It also cited unspecified shortcomings in "leadership culture" and a lack of standardized simulations not only at Malmstrom but throughout the nuclear missile corps.

Among the corrective measures cited in the report: Arrange to hold recapture exercises at one launch silo among the 50 silos in each of the 341st's three Minuteman squadrons, using "realistic, varied, simple-to-complex" scenarios based on what the Pentagon calls its "local nuclear security threat capabilities assessment." Also, the Air Force is taking steps to more closely track lessons learned from each "recapture" exercise.

The Air Force document did not identify or otherwise describe the security team, but each Minuteman 3 missile base has "tactical response force" teams specially trained and equipped for nuclear weapons recovery.

Two years ago, the Air Force promoted these teams as a "secret weapon" ensuring nuclear security, saying they are provided "an extensive amount of unique training and are expected to perform flawlessly in whatever scenario thrown their way."

Lt. Col. John Sheets, a spokesman for Air Force Global Strike Command, which is responsible for the nuclear missile corps as well as the nuclear-capable bomber aircraft, said Wednesday he could not comment further.

"We cannot divulge additional details of the scenario or the response tactics due to it being sensitive information that could compromise security," Sheets said.

He added that all "countermeasures," or corrective actions, that were proposed in the review obtained by the AP have been accomplished. The only exception is a plan for more extensive practicing of security response tactics at launch silos, an effort that requires signed agreements with owners of the private land on which the missile silos are situated.

The silos are concrete-lined holes in the ground, mostly on remote stretches of private land whose owners have accommodated the facilities since they were built in the 1960s. They are spread across such large expanses that security forces cannot constantly watch every facility, although they are equipped with fire and security alarms.

Security forces are responsible for a range of protective roles on the Air Force's three nuclear missile bases, including along roads used to transport missiles and warheads to and from launch silos, at weapons storage facilities and at launch silos and launch control centers. The Air Force operates three Minuteman 3 bases — in North Dakota, Montana and Wyoming — each with 150 missiles.

Col. Robert Stanley, who was commander of the 341st Wing at the time, said that despite the inspection failure, "there was no question about our capability to operate safely and with complete confidence. Still, he said, more needed to be done to ensure that "some very young airmen" understand their responsibilities "much more clearly."

Nine days later he fired the officer in charge of his security forces, Col. David Lynch, and replaced him temporarily with Col. John T. Wilcox II. In March, Stanley resigned amid a scandal involving alleged cheating on proficiency tests by up to 100 missile officers at Malmstrom, and the Air Force replaced Stanley with Wilcox.

In an AP interview in January, Stanley suggested there had been disagreement about how the security exercise was conducted during the August inspection. Without providing specifics, he said it was simulated "in a way that we've never seen before," adding: "It confused our airmen. We were off by a matter of seconds."

Colonists Fighting For American Freedom Would Be Considered Extremists Per USAF Training Guide

“In U.S. history, there are many examples of extremist ideologies and movements. The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule and the Confederate states who sought to secede from the Northern states are just two examples,” according to the training guide.

The preceding quote is from the Department of Defense (DOD) Training Manual. Is this an example to shock the readers or  has the US gone so far away from its founding that now those who created this government are no longer the heroes but terrorists?  Regardless it could be indicative of deeper and more concerning thought by the military.

No longer are the reasons for the colonists dissatisfaction with the Crown important, it is the way they went about doing it.They should  have sat down with good 'ole King George and asked nicely for their freedom.  Somehow we doubt that would have worked very well.

 

The tone of this manual sends chills up and down the spine. We wonder what other pablum has been printed.   Is posse comititis even covered? We doubt it.

Conservative Tom

DoD Training Manual: ‘Extremist’ Founding Fathers ‘Would Not Be Welcome In Today’s Military’

Manual lists people concerned with “individual liberties, states’ rights, and how to make the world a better place” as potential extremists

Adan Salazar
Infowars.com
August 24, 2013

See update below

Conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch recently obtained a Department of Defense training manual which lists people who embrace “individual liberties” and honor “states’ rights,” among other characteristics, as potential “extremists” who are likely to be members of “hate groups.”

Marked “for training purposes only,” the documents, obtained Thursday through a Freedom of Information Act request submitted in April, include PowerPoint slides and lesson plans, among which is a January 2013 Air Force “student guide” distributed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institutesimply entitled “Extremism.”

Judicial Watch’s FOIA request asked for “Any and all records concerning, regarding, or related to the preparation and presentation of training materials on hate groups or hate crimes distributed or used by the Air Force.”

As the group notes, “The document defines extremists as ‘a person who advocates the use of force or violence; advocates supremacist causes based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or national origin; or otherwise engages to illegally deprive individuals or groups of their civil rights.’”

The manual goes on to bar military personnel from “active participation” in such extremist organization activities as “publicly demonstrating,” “rallying,” “fundraising” and “organizing,” basically denying active-duty military from exercising the rights they so ardently fight to defend.

It begins its introduction of a section titled, “Extremist ideologies,” by describing the American colonists who sought independence from British rule as a historical example of extremism.

“In U.S. history, there are many examples of extremist ideologies and movements. The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule and the Confederate states who sought to secede from the Northern states are just two examples,” according to the training guide.

In a section drawing inspiration from a 1992 book titled “Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political Extremism in America,” the manual also lists “Doomsday thinking” under “traits or behaviors that tend to represent the extremist style.”

Extremists often predict dire or catastrophic consequences from a situation or from a failure to follow a specific course, and they tend to exhibit a kind of crisis-mindedness. It can be a Communist takeover, a Nazi revival, nuclear war, earthquakes, floods, or the wrath of God. Whatever it is, it is just around the corner unless we follow their program and listen to their special insight and wisdom, to which only the truly enlightened have access. For extremists, any setback or defeat is the beginning of the end.

“Nowadays,” the manual explains, “instead of dressing in sheets or publicly espousing hate messages, many extremists will talk of individual liberties, states’ rights, and how to make the world a better place.”

Judicial Watch also acknowledges the Southern Poverty Law Center “is listed as a resource for information on hate groups and referenced several times throughout the guide,” even though the group itself was directly responsible for a “hate crime” perpetrated on the Family Research Council after it was listed on the SPLC’s “hate map.”

Infowars readers will find much of the training guide’s contents unsurprising as they merely reinforce what we have exhaustively documented in the past.

In 2009, Infowars obtained the “law enforcement sensitive” contents of a Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC) report entitled “The Modern Militia Movement” which listed supporters of presidential candidates Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin, and Bob Barr as potential “militia” influenced terrorists.

Also, in July 2012 Infowars blew the lid on a Department of Homeland Security-funded study, produced by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, that characterized Americans who are “suspicious of centralized federal authority,” and “reverent of individual liberty” as “extreme right-wing” terrorists.

Indeed, the latest report echoes scenes from Alex Jones’ prescient documentary 9/11: The Road to Tyranny, made over a decade ago, which covered the fact that FEMA and other government bureaus have for years been training law enforcement agencies to regard people who espouse conservative ideologies, such as those represented by the Founding Fathers, as terrorists.

It can no longer be denied that military and local law enforcement crosshairs have gradually been realigned from targeting phantom terrorists overseas to targeting domestic “extremists,” a broad, all-encompassing term that accommodates anyone generally challenging or questioning the status quo.

As Judicial Watch notes, although the documents were obtained through the Air Force, the fact that they originated in a DOD office means they have likely been distributed throughout the government’s various agencies.

Judicial Watch president Tom Fitton concluded that the documents fall in line with the Obama administration’s “nasty habit of equating basic conservative values with terrorism,” and that the language closely “echoes the IRS targeting language of conservative and Tea Party investigations.” “And now… its Defense Department suggests that the Founding Fathers, and many conservative Americans, would not be welcome in today’s military… After reviewing this document, one can’t help but worry for the future and morale of our nation’s armed forces.”